The English translation goes roughly like this:
Trapping Safety
Into Rules
edited by Corinne
Bieder and Mathilde Bourrier (ISBN 978-1-4094-5226-3)
My current
employer has a very fine internal library that contains a decent selection of
books on safety. The fine ladies in the library also alert professionals to new
releases that aren’t in the collection yet, but may be wanted in future. The
title of this book immediately caught my attention when it was mentioned in a
newsletter and that very day an order for a personal copy went out.
On 278
pages the book presents a collection of 15 articles, plus an introduction and epilogue
by the editors. The contributions are based upon experiences within various
branches: (mainly Norwegian) offshore, air traffic control, railways and patient
safety, and there are also some more theoretically oriented contributions. The
fact that the book is a collection of articles slightly affects the coherence and
flow (even though I’m pleasantly surprised by the fact that the contributors
refer to each other’s contributions quite frequently) and in some cases also
the readability suffers. Some authors just seem to have a hard time ditching
the academic approach to writing that they forget that books should be easy to
read. A listing of references that fills an entire paragraph is just nonsense
and should have been caught and removed by the editors.
The book’s title
might suggest that the book has a critical stance with regard to (safety)rules,
but as the subtitle ‘How desirable or avoidable is proceduralization?’ indicates
the book highlights both sides and discusses both the pros and cons of safety
rules in four different parts with the following headers:
1: Where do
we stand on the bureaucratic path towards safety?
2:
Contrasting approaches to safety rules
3:
Practical attempts to reach beyond proceduralization: The magic tools illusion
4: standing back
to move forward
The subjects
discussed in the book are too varied to cover in a full overview here, so let
me pick out some highlights. In part 1 we find among others an interesting
discussion of ‘No rule, no use’. This
is an attitude that almost any safety professional will have met at some time (or
even regularly). A safety measure may be wise to implement, but never the less
the question arises: “Where does it say that we have to do this?”. Ergo, quite
often without a rule saying so, one does not implement a safety measure.
In the
second part especially Kenneth Pettersen’s discussion about abductive thinking appealed to me. Me discusses this from a background in airplane
maintenance. Mechanics
often manage in doing their jobs and dealing with unexpected situations because they deviate from rules. The
standard rules often aren’t helpful to solve unique problems, so one has to
deviate. This is one of the most interesting contributions in the collection
and more or less mandatory reading.
Part 3 is the
most voluminous part of the book. It discusses a number of attempts and
experiences with possible alternatives to traditional rules and regulations. The
first two contributions are from medical care and are about the use of
checklists in operation rooms -what I’m missing here is the nuance that a (good)
checklist in fact is little more than a very smartly written procedure - and
about crew resource management in hospitals. After that we get two little exciting
articles about safety management (systems) and their influence on procedures in
air traffic and railways.
Much more
exciting are no less than three articles about regulations and safety culture
with a background in Norwegian offshore where elements of safety culture are implemented
in laws and regulations over the last decades. This phenomenon is regarded with
a critical eye amd among other things the authors discuss how far it is
possible to steer and regulate safety culture. Especially chapter 13 is
interesting with its argumentation why regulators should leave safety culture
alone and rather stick to rules.
The final
part contains only two articles of which the first deals with the paradox role that
procedures apparently have in safety management, because they on one side are a
means to transfer knowledge and prescribe a safe way of doing a job, but on the
other hand they may also cause rigidity and ‘auto pilot behaviour’. The final
article by Todd La Porte has some interesting view on the differences between administrative
and operational safety rules. Of special interest is the anecdote about the
aborted exercise on an aircraft carrier and the praise that the “culprit” (the
sailor who had made a mistake, but reported this immediately upon discovery) received
from the highest ranking officer.
In the
epilogue both editors stress once more that rules are affected by the way they
are created (preferably bottom-up, although also this is no guarantee for a good
rule) and that one before creating a new rule must ask oneself the question
what the added value of a rule will be. One of the leasons to be learned from
this book.
Published
by Ashgate (www.ashgate.com)
Geen opmerkingen:
Een reactie posten